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or turn off a stimulus. We shall see later that this countervailing 
or restoring influence assumes quite familiar psychophysical and 
physiological forms.
The concept that a restoring influence is an integral part of all 
perceptual processes is, perhaps, new, although sensory adapta-
tion, which is discussed below, is familiar. It will be argued that 
such a restoring influence is the rule rather than the exception, and 
that violation of the rule leads to negative consequences. We shall 
develop the argument progressively.
TheoreTical developmenT
UnificaTion of The UniTs of percepTUal sTimUli: inTrodUcTion 
of UncerTainTy
We consider perception as a term describing a broad range of cog-
nitive functions, one of the simplest of which is sensation. That is, 
the set of sensory functions will be taken as a subset of the set of 
perceptual functions. Traditionally, the values of the stimulus that 
appears in Figure 2 are written with different units for each sensory 
modality. This tradition is quite natural. For example, the newton 
which is a unit of force can be used to measure a stretch stimulus, 
while units of molarity are used in the chemical senses, sound 
pressure for hearing, etc. More complex stimuli such as music or 
graphical art cannot be expressed in simple physical units yet they 
are, unquestionably perceptual stimuli, and each is discussed using 
its characteristic referent (e.g., harmony, contrast…). In order to 
apply the LCB principle most effectively in the field of sensation 
and perception, we shall find it advantageous to convert the “units” 
in which stimuli are expressed to a common, dimensionless form. 
We may lose some coloration by doing so but the result will be a 
simpler theoretical structure.
In order to carry out this unification of the units of perceptual stim-
uli, we must abstract a feature shared by all stimuli – not a simple task 
and perhaps one without a unique solution. However, it is suggested 
inTrodUcTion
definiTion
Although usually designated as “Le Chatelier’s principle”, this con-
cept was, apparently, discovered independently by Henri Louis Le 
Chatelier and Karl Ferdinand Braun. Le Chatelier’s treatise was 
published in 1888. The Le Chatelier–Braun principle (LCB prin-
ciple) states that when a system in dynamic equilibrium is acted 
on by an external stress, it will adjust in such a way as to relieve 
the stress and establish a new equilibrium. Although this principle 
was developed through the medium of chemistry, it found expres-
sion in many other scientific fields. There is a general tendency for 
influences that produce changes in an equilibrium state to induce 
countervailing influences that oppose the changes and establish 
a new state of equilibrium. Lenz’s law in electromagnetism is an 
example of the extension of the LCB into physics. Graphically we 
can express a generalized Le Chatelier–Braun principle as shown 
in Figure 1.
GeneralizaTion of le chaTelier’s principle To sensaTion and 
percepTion
It is suggested in this paper that the generalized Le Chatelier princi-
ple governs the processes of sensation and perception, as illustrated 
in Figure 2 and it may be applied to advantage in sensory science. 
We begin on the left-hand side, with an initial state of sensory equi-
librium. This initial state may be, for example, a state of quiescence 
for the visual system, where no light stimulus is applied to a light 
receptor. The stimulus may be a sudden bright light, introducing 
a transient state of disequilibrium. Perhaps unfamiliar in Figure 2 
is the countervailing influence, which may also be referred to as a 
restoring influence. In the vision example given, the eye may simply 
rotate away from the visual stimulus, leading to a new state of sen-
sory equilibrium which may or may not approximate the original 
state of quiescence. The countervailing influence tends to mute Frontiers in Physiology  |  Fractal Physiology    June 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 17  |  2
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the stimulus – turning off the stimulus, so to speak. Therefore in 
Figure 2, in place of the word “stimulus”, we may now substitute 
“uncertainty established” (or “stimulus-evoked question asked”); 
and in place of the phrase “restoring influence”, it would seem natu-
ral to substitute “uncertainty resolved, partially or completely” (or 
“question answered, at least in part”). These changes are introduced 
later, in Figure 3.
The measUremenT of UncerTainTy
It is all very well to convert stimuli into uncertainties, but can 
one assign a numerical measure to perceptual uncertainty, and 
is a numerical measure always possible? The answer seems to be 
that a Shannon measure of uncertainty can be applied to steady 
sensory stimuli, but that more complex perceptual inputs cannot 
be convincingly quantified. Simple sensory stimuli are examples 
of continuous stimuli: they may vary in intensity continuously 
from some threshold value to some physiological maximum. For 
example, a solution that is tasted may have concentration 0.500, 
0.501 M, etc. A tone may have sound level 30.0, 30.1 dB, etc. These 
stimuli enjoy a continuum of values which we could designate 
by v. Then if p(v) is the corresponding probability density func-
tion for the stimulus, −∫p(v) log p(v) dv, is a differential entropy 
that can be used to express uncertainty (Shannon and Weaver, 
1949). If v is normally distributed or uniformly distributed, the 
differential entropy will be a linear function of the logarithm of 
the variance of the distribution. Or, speaking casually, the greater 
the dispersion of the stimuli (reflecting uncertainty), the greater 
the differential entropy.
Everyday perceptual stimuli are often discrete stimuli (vis-à-vis 
the continuous sensory stimuli), whose Shannon entropy (uncer-
tainty) can be calculated from −Σi pi log pi, where the pi are the 
probabilities of the possible discrete outcomes. For example the key 
that I am looking at is either the key to my car, to the front door 
of my home, to my office… a set of discrete possibilities. If there 
that such a feature, common to all psychological and physiological 
stimuli, is the “stimulus-evoked question”. For example, if the stimulus 
is light from an incandescent source, the implied, stimulus-invoked 
question may be: “What color is the light?” Or, if a stimulus set con-
sists only of blue lights, the implied question may be: “How bright is 
the blue light?” In the case of simple sensation, the implied question 
can be regarded as asked by the sensory receptor (What color is the 
light?), and answered by the stimulus (Blue). There are similarities to 
the television game Jeopardy: each stimulus-answer implies a certain 
receptor-question. For example, if the stimulus-answer is “He was 
British prime minister 1940-1945”, the receptor-question provided 
by the contestant is “Who was Winston Churchill?”
The advantage of associating stimuli with implied questions is 
that it does seem to permit the expression of all stimuli in a common 
“unit”, namely uncertainty. “What color is the light?” expresses the 
a priori uncertainty of the perceiver about the color of the light: it 
could be red or yellow or blue … “How bright is the blue light?” 
expresses the a priori uncertainty that the blue light could assume 
many different levels of brightness. So we shall adopt uncertainty 
as the common unit or language into which all stimuli may be cast. 
In dealing with more complex perceptual stimuli, the questions, of 
course, are commensurately more complex.
When we apply this idea of the stimulus-evoked question to 
Figure 2, it introduces a degree of symmetry. We recall that the 
“restoring influence” is the process that partially or totally nullifies 
Countervailing
Influence                       Influence
Equilibrium             Disequilibrium            New Equilibrium
Figure 1 | Classical Le Chatelier–Braun schema.
Restoring 
Stimulus                    Influence
Sensory Equilibrium             Disequilibrium           New Sensory Equilibrium
Figure 2 | Le Chatelier–Braun principle extended to sensory function.
Uncertainty      Uncertainty
Resolved Established
Sensory                    Disequilibrium            New Sensory Equilibrium
Equilibrium
Assertive      Interrogative
Phase             Phase
(Stimulus)      (Receptor)                           
Figure 3 | evolution of Figure 2 to represent uncertainty set up by a receptor and resolved by receipt of a stimulus.www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 17  |  3
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has two phases, the interrogative, or “sensory” phase, and the 
  assertive, or “motor” phase. The “sensory” phase consists, at least 
in part, of the absorption of energy (e.g., light, heat, sound) from 
the external world; the “motor” phase is more generally described 
as an “energy expending phase”. In a much earlier publication 
(Norwich, 1982) these phases were described as active and passive 
phases respectively.
adapTaTion
Sensory adaptation is the familiar process whereby steady sensory 
stimuli, such as steady taste or olfactory stimuli, fade progressively 
from our sensorium with the passage of time without conscious 
intervention. An odor that was perceived as being intense 5 min 
ago may be nearly imperceptible now. A solution held in the mouth 
that initially tasted sweet or salty will have very little taste after a 
minute or two.
Adaptation enters the sensory LCB principle at the level of the 
countervailing influence, or the process that tends to diminish the 
effect of a sensory stimulus by reducing its uncertainty value. We 
addressed the issue of progressively decreasing uncertainty induced 
by repeated sampling of the steady stimulus when we recalled that 
the sample mean is larger than the standard error of the mean. Our 
uncertainty about the population mean (read here the “mean value 
of the stimulus”) diminishes with the size of the sample (n-value). 
That is, the process of repeated sampling parallels the process of 
adaptation (Norwich, 1993). In this respect, sensory adaptation 
can be viewed as a process of reduction in stimulus uncertainty, 
or gaining information about the stimulus.
“percepTion” Generalized
The process known as perception, then, consists of the dual function 
of establishing and disestablishing uncertainty. As we have seen, 
this process can occur from the behavioral level (such as evert-
ing the eyes or finding an object) down to the neural level (such 
as sensory adaptation). Uncertainty functions are nested from 
macroscopic to microscopic, in the manner of a fractal. Examples 
of this property will follow. The development and resolution of 
uncertainty is found in many functions of activity, including the 
process of deduction.
Perception through logical deduction
The LCB principle of perception is mirrored in the way we talk as 
well as in the logical manner in which we think.
“What are you carrying in that bag? Oh. I see. Oranges.”
(Question: uncertainty established, sensory. Answer: uncertainty 
resolved, motor).
Within symbolic logic: “If p then q. p therefore q”. Usually inter-
preted: “If statement p is true, then statement q is true. p is true, 
therefore q is true.” However, we may also interpret the logical code 
within a Le Chatelier paradigm. That is,
Interrogative or establishing uncertainty: Is q true (“sensory”)? 
q is true if p is true.
Assertive or resolving uncertainty: p has been found to be true 
(“motor”), therefore
q is true. Or, q has been perceived logically.
are equal probabilities that the key that I am withdrawing from my 
pocket fits any one of n locks, the entropy (uncertainty) is just equal 
to the logarithm of n. In this case, the numerical measure is very 
simple: the more locks that my key may possibly fit, the greater the 
entropy (uncertainty). The stimulus has the “quantity” log n.
However, more complex stimuli do not permit such simple 
numerical quantification.
The resolUTion of UncerTainTy: incorporaTion of Time
After uncertainty is set up by a perceptual process, how then is 
this uncertainty resolved? A simple answer is that the perceiver 
executes a process which will select one of the possibilities as “true” 
or “extant”, and eliminates many of the others. Therefore, the steady 
auditory tone of uncertain intensity is perceived to have a level of 
about 50 dB – uncertainty resolved to the neighborhood of 50 dB 
(in the case of a continuous stimulus); or the key is perceived to 
be my office key in the case of a discrete stimulus. That is, there 
is some psychological or physiological action that carries out the 
process of resolving uncertainty. However, particularly in the case 
of the continuous stimulus, one cannot always remove all of the 
uncertainty. The tone is perceived to have a sound level of about 
50 dB. Moreover, such perceptual events do not occur instantane-
ously; there is a certain processing time required. It may take mil-
liseconds or seconds to resolve the intensity of an unknown tone. 
During this interval of time, the auditory system will take many 
samples of its unknown tone. Perhaps the perceptual system – the 
hearing system in this case – will avail itself of the mean of a set 
of these samples. The uncertainty or log (variance), of a single 
sample of a tone might then be replaced by the log (variance) of 
the mean of all the samples (dividing the mean by the number of 
samples). The variance of the mean will always be smaller than 
that of individual samples, and, hence, the uncertainty of a con-
tinuous sensory signal will be reduced, but not eliminated, by the 
active process of sampling. A physicist might say (and we’ll return 
to physics later) that uncertainty of a classical event is reduced by 
the process of observation.
Discrete events also require processing time. The mechanical 
process of examining my key is also time-consuming. When I 
look at the key in my hand, it is quickly apparent that it is too 
large for my filing cabinet, but could fit my house or office. A 
moment later, I have turned it over in my hand and looked at its 
shape and color, which identifies it as my office key. So a certain 
amount of time and perhaps motor activity is needed in order 
to reduce the uncertainty.
We may conclude, at least tentatively, that the countervailing 
influence in Figure 2 is one that reduces the initial uncertainty, 
requires a finite period of time, and constitutes part of the act 
of perception.
collecTinG ideas
Figure 2 has now evolved into Figure 3. A receptor unit may be 
thought of as the interrogative or questioning portion of the per-
ceptual process. It asks the question: “Of all the possibilities, which 
one or ones does this stimulus comprise?” establishing a level of 
uncertainty. The stimulus provides a unique answer to the question 
or narrows down the number possibilities. That is, speaking very 
generally, the Le Chatelier–Braun principle adapted to   perception Frontiers in Physiology  |  Fractal Physiology    June 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 17  |  4
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the stretch stimulus, and we have cycled through a Le Chatelier 
process from one state of equilibrium to the next. The fact that a 
muscle contracts is not as important to us here as the fact that as 
contraction occurs, the stretch stimulus is effectively removed by 
a countervailing stimulus (Figures 1 and 2). The scale of action of 
LCB is here at the neuronal or cellular level, midway between the 
quantum and behavioral scales.
However, some rather unexpected consequences now emerge 
from the generalized LCB principle. New theoretical structures 
generate new ideas and, often, new consequences.
philosophical consideraTions emerGinG from The sensory le 
chaTelier–BraUn principle
If the general process of perception is encoded by Figure 3: uncer-
tainty established (sensory) followed by uncertainty resolved or 
removed (motor, or at least energy consuming), what significance 
can then be attached to a sensory stimulus which resolves no uncer-
tainty whatever? It is not immediately evident that there can exist a 
non-zero stimulus which resolves no uncertainty, and provides no 
answer. However, let us study the following experiment.
Consider an image, controlled by optical means to occupy a 
fixed position on the retina of a human participant. No matter 
how the eye may be moved, the image remains fixed in position 
on the retina. Initially, immediately after the image is initiated, it 
is sharply visible; however, after a few seconds the image periph-
eral to the fixation point begins to “gray-out”. The image fades 
from  the  sensorium  of  the  perceiver  (Ditchburn  and  Fender, 
1955). This phenomenon, known as Troxler’s effect, can be easily 
demonstrated for oneself. If one stares at a large dot on a blank 
page, trying hard not to blink or move one’s eyes, the dot will 
fade and become invisible. The explanation for the phenomenon 
can be found, at least partially, in the perceptual LCP. When the 
visual system establishes complete certainty about the nature of 
a percept (the scene or object that produces a stabilized image), 
when no uncertainty remains about the nature of the object, and 
no question is posed, then no answer can be offered, and hence, 
no perception takes place. That is, once uncertainty about the 
image has been unequivocally removed, the process of perception 
ceases. In such a case, a non-zero stimulus (light continues to 
reach the retina) resolves no uncertainty, and, therefore, becomes 
“not perceivable”. Why do images not vanish from our field of 
vision during everyday life? Probably because the images are held 
in existence by the tiny eye movements called microsaccades that 
prevent these images from being fixed on the retina, and hence 
prevent perfect certainty. The fading of fixed images is an example 
of sensory adaptation (Clarke, 1957).
However, the general philosophical question remains: Is it 
possible to perceive “a certainty”? If I am absolutely certain that 
I have a quarter in my pocket, must I in some way re-establish 
doubt about its presence before I can detect its presence in my 
pocket sensorially? Looked at in this manner, the fixed retinal 
image discussed above evolved into a state of imperceptibility 
because the image simply had no more information to convey 
to the perceiver. The effect of microsaccades is to reinitialize the 
visual system, permitting a new Le Chatelier cycle to begin (new 
state of sensory equilibrium), which again asks the implicit ques-
tion: “What is this image?” A second displacement of equilibrium 
We note the generality conferred upon the concept of perception 
using LCB. We perceive when uncertainty is established and then 
removed, whether this process occurs directly by observation or 
logically by inference.
Perception viewed linguistically: Latin roots of the  
uncertainty concept
Irish philosopher George Berkeley has written in his Principles of 
Human Knowledge the expression for which he is, perhaps, best 
known: esse is percipi: to be is to be perceived. The Latin verb perci-
pere has been used to refer to perception with the senses. However, to 
convey perception with understanding, Latin often used the infini-
tive intellegere, which is an interesting word, with direct links to our 
current study. It is synthesized from two simpler Latin words: inter, 
between, and legere to choose. To the Roman thinker, the process 
of perception with understanding was synonymous with making 
a choice from among a set of possibilities – the same idea we have 
used above in framing the general LCB principle for perception. 
Other early languages embody the same concept. The process from 
stimulus to response, from sensory to motor, is one of selecting one 
or few from among many possibilities. Plus ça change …
links To modern physics
Quantum observation is, at least arguably, an extension of psycho-
physics, in that it relates a physical measure of the observed world 
(energy, momentum, geometrical structure) to the final observa-
tion (or perception) made by a human observer. It is then not 
surprising to find that some of the concepts of quantum physics 
apply, with appropriate changes, in the mesoscopic, or middle-
sized, world of everyday sensation and perception. Among the enig-
matic ideas of quantum physics is the concept of the wavefunction, 
which is a mathematical function defining the state of a portion of 
the world before it is observed directly. The wavefunction is really 
a superposition – or a piling on top of each other – of all the vari-
ous ways in which the world could be observed, before it is actu-
ally observed. When this wavefunction is “collapsed”, which occurs 
when an observation (we may prefer perception) is made, the heap 
of possible ways that the world could be observed condenses to one 
or just a few of these ways. This scenario should now be familiar to 
the reader; it is very close to the process of “uncertainty established” 
and “uncertainty resolved” that form part of the sensory LCB prin-
ciple. Turning the analogy around, the wavefunction of quantum 
mechanics is the sensory component of quantum perception, and 
the collapse of the wavefunction is the motor component.
links To physioloGy
Spinal reflexes are readily incorporated into the generalized LCB 
principle. Consider the simple knee-jerk. A peripheral stimulus, 
such as stretch to a tendon stretch receptor, acts directly through 
the spinal cord (perhaps through the medium of one interneuron), 
and activates a motor neuron which will produce muscle contrac-
tion. This is an example of a simple spinal reflex arc. The stretch 
stimulus, which is a force acting on a stretch receptor, displaces 
the system from equilibrium. A signal is relayed by means of a 
sensory afferent neuron to the central nervous system. A motor 
neuron then activates muscle fibers. The motor activity, which 
provides the restoring force, acts to remove, or at least minimize, www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 17  |  5
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recognize that in the final state of sensory equilibrium there must 
remain some level of uncertainty if the sensorium is to remain 
active or aware.
discUssion
fracTal-like naTUre of The sensory lcB principle
It is noteworthy that the sensory LCB principle acts behaviorally, 
in a manner involving whole movements of the organism (such 
as searching or puzzle-solving); organically (involving the senses); 
and neurally (such as reflex arcs). That is, the LCB operates in the 
same manner at different scales within the organism. In this way 
it emulates the structure of a fractal.
UncerTainTy redUcTion as consUmmaTion
There is some evidence that the restoration phase, the uncertainty 
reduction  component  of  the  sensory  LCP,  can  be  regarded  as 
“consummating” the perceptual process. The term consummation 
suggests that motor activity undertaken brings about a state of 
perfection or fulfillment to the sensory event. In some cases, this 
desirable conclusion may be self-evident. For example, the spinal 
reflex mediating withdrawal from a painful stimulus definitely leads 
to a desirable result. There are other cases, too, to support the use 
of this term, consummation. When one perceives the solution to 
a puzzle, the uncertainty engendered by the puzzle is reduced, the 
result is the desired result, or a consummation of the effort of solu-
tion. But is this effect universal? It may be argued that it is. Within 
a physiological context, the trigeminally mediated nasal stimulus 
is consummated by sneezing; the vagus-mediated bronchial reflex 
is consummated by coughing; bladder stimulation of pudendal 
afferents by micturition, etc. Even parturition brings about a con-
summation of the urge to push. We will not belabor the point here, 
but rather just plant the seed of the idea that the restoration phase 
of the sensory LCP may be associated with consummation of the 
effort. One can ponder this concept and its converse: Is failure 
to consummate a sensory activity by reducing uncertainty always 
unfulfilling, uncomfortable or painful?
applicaTions of The lcB principle To proBlems and eniGmas
The concept that the restoring influence reducing the displace-
ment from equilibrium brings about a consummation of sorts casts 
some light on why certain activities are more pleasant than others. 
Trivially, we experience a degree of consternation before we solve 
the jigsaw puzzle; there is some uncertainty about how the pieces 
will interlock. When we reduce the uncertainty by interlocking the 
pieces, a motor activity, we consummate our search and experience 
some satisfaction. Failure to solve a puzzle can leave us in a state 
of dissatisfaction. Mellers (2000) has observed “… pain can arise 
from the frustration of not achieving a goal”.
Frustration of this nature can be decidedly non-trivial. Phantom-
limb pain is pain experienced in limbs that have been removed (see, 
for example, Melzack, 2006). We can, perhaps, begin to understand 
this phenomenon when we realize that sensation mediated by sen-
sory nerves from the amputated limb cannot “adapt”. Attempting 
to move a limb in an effort to alter or reduce the sensations issuing 
from it is a kind of “frustration”. That is, no motor function by the 
amputee can reduce the uncertainty that characterizes a sensory 
stimulus, which brings about a feeling of pain or discomfort.
from an incompletely adapted system is expressed by the second 
curve in Figure 4 on the right-hand side: New sensory equilib-
rium disturbed by second stimulus leads to second new sensory 
equilibrium, etc.
possiBiliTy of incompleTe redUcTion of UncerTainTy
We have seen above that the end result of the process of perception 
is not necessarily the total resolution of the uncertainty. I may not 
find my key, but I can reduce the number of locations in which 
it may be hiding; I may not discern your facial expression but I 
can see that you are not distressed. So the result of the process of 
perception may be the reduction, if not the total obliteration, of 
uncertainty. In simple cases, the reduction in uncertainty may be 
quantified as the initial uncertainty value minus the final value. 
Thus, for example, reduction in uncertainty may be expressed by 
the reduction in the number of locations for a missing key, or, in 
general, the reduction in the number of possible outcomes to an 
event. In simple cases, the Wiener–Shannon entropy provides a 
numerical measure of residual uncertainty. So for equally prob-
able events, the reduction in uncertainty can be quantified by log 
(number of possibilities prior to perception) – log (number of 
possibilities after the act of perception).
It is significant that the quantum physical counterpart of the 
motor phase of perception, namely the collapse of the wavefunction, 
does not eliminate all uncertainty about the quantum event. There 
still remains a residual uncertainty that is expressed by Heisenberg’s 
celebrated Uncertainty Principle. It seems that at its very roots, 
nature places limits on the degree to which uncertainty can be 
reduced, both at the microscopic (quantum) and the mesoscopic 
(“everyday”) levels. We recognize the significance of Heisenberg’s 
Uncertainty Principle in cognitive science: if uncertainty could be 
reduced to zero, possibly the event would become unperceivable, as 
we have discovered philosophically before. Therefore, we come to 
Figure 4 | Change of uncertainty, H, with time in a sensory system in 
response to two sequential stimuli. H(0) = 0. In response to a steady 
stimulus applied at t = 0, H rises rapidly, then adapts to a value of about 3 as 
uncertainty declines, but does not vanish. A second stimulus greater in 
magnitude than the first, is applied at t = 50. Uncertainty rises again, and then 
adapts to a value of about 8.Frontiers in Physiology  |  Fractal Physiology    June 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 17  |  6
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There may be some overlap between an LCB process and a 
  system influenced by self-organized criticality (SOC). Within SOC, 
components are usually governed by simple rules. Pressure builds 
within the system until some threshold for change is traversed. 
This is a critical point. Up to this point, there is a parallel with an 
LCB process, which begins in some initial state of equilibrium, and 
remains there until external influences impel a change. However, 
in SOC, the system often progresses past the critical point to chaos 
or avalanche formation, while the LCB process usually progresses 
more classically to a new state of equilibrium.
sUmmary and conclUsions
The principle of Le Chatelier and Braun has been found to govern 
many systems. It asserts that a force or disturbance, when applied 
to a resting system will drive the system away from its equilibrium 
state, but will invoke a countervailing force or disturbance that 
will tend to mitigate or minimize the effect of the disturbance, 
leaving the system in a new and displaced state of equilibrium. Le 
Chatelier’s principle has been invoked many times in the past in a 
bid to understand reflex activity. One of the early papers dealt with 
the withdrawal response of the land snail (Humphrey, 1930), and 
has been often cited in recent years.
There is a caveat that should be invoked. The LCB is a principle 
not a law. LCB is a kind of rule of thumb which complements 
the laws of science. Le Chatelier’s principle provides a simple rule 
by which one can infer changes in chemical equilibria, but one 
can deduce these same changes using the known laws of physical 
chemistry. Similarly, Lenz’s law may exemplify the LCB principle, 
but one can deduce this law from the laws of electromagnetism. 
When we apply the LCB to biology, we are, in a sense, extrapolating 
its use beyond known laws of biochemistry, biophysics, etc. There 
remains the incumbency to discover these laws in detail, relegating 
LCB to its proper place as an adjunctive principle.
It should be emphasized that the LCB principle is not an expres-
sion of a closed loop control system, where a variable is brought as 
closely as possible to some reference level by means of a negative 
feedback loop. Powers (1973) extended the scope of closed loop 
control systems into sensory science, regarding behavior as “control 
of perception”. Perceptions, in Powers’ view, are controlled when 
they are kept as close as possible to internal reference levels. The 
approach taken in this paper is simpler, and takes us in quite a 
different direction. There is no internal reference level, no error 
signal, and no feedback loop.
We required a general unit with which to measure the state 
of sensory equilibrium and displacement from equilibrium and 
we chose uncertainty. Much of our discussion was confined to 
sensory systems operating between levels of equilibrium. Initial 
equilibrium may be represented as a state of complete certainty (no 
questions are asked). When a positive stimulus is applied, uncer-
tainty increases, because the nature of the stimulus is not known 
instantaneously. The restoring influence is usually motor (or at least 
energy-expending) in quality, and guides the system in such a way 
that the uncertainty is reduced. The final, new state of equilibrium 
represents a new level of uncertainty.
We can extend the LCB principle to a generalized stimulus 
(a simple sensory stimulus, or more complex stimulus such as a 
visual scene, auditory landscape, etc.), and apply the same rules 
This concept was illustrated dramatically (Ramachandran 
et al. 1995). By use of a mirror to “superimpose” a normal hand 
on a phantom, it became possible for the patient to “move” 
the phantom limb, and to unclench it from potentially painful 
positions. Once again, consummating the motor process in a Le 
Chatelier process brings about reduction in distress. Similarly 
vertigo can be a major medical problem. Vertigo is the sensation 
of dizziness or spinning experienced when a patient is completely 
stationary. Again, the sensation cannot be “reduced” by volun-
tary action by the patient. That is, the patient cannot reduce the 
sensation of vertigo by any motor action such as reducing the 
rotation of his or her head. The inability to “consummate” leads 
to gross discomfort. We might conjecture that movement of the 
afflicted person can be used here to simulate consummation 
and reduce vertigo.
Beyond The sensory lcB principle: is The UncerTainTy 
redUcTion phase deTerminisTic or random?
The simple application of the LCB principle to sensation and 
perception mandates only that a restoration phase is present. We 
have classified this restoration phase as the phase of reduction in 
uncertainty about a stimulus. However, can we ascertain whether 
the restoration is deterministic or random in nature?
When uncertainty reduction is purely sensory, for example the 
sampling of an odorant by the nose, it may be embraced totally by 
the physiological process of adaptation, over which the perceiver has 
little if any control. Perhaps in such cases the system is largely deter-
ministic in nature. However, when uncertainty reduction is brought 
about by conscious activity, such as the search for the best move in 
a chess game, the matter is less clear. Do we search randomly for a 
move or do we implement a logical process that is largely determin-
istic? Neural networks, for example, can evolve an optimal strategy 
by testing random changes to network   components. If the randomly 
induced changes bring the network closer to its goal (in our case, 
reduction in uncertainty), the change is retained, otherwise it is 
abandoned. This method is sometimes called gradient descent. So 
it would seem that sometimes the process of uncertainty reduc-
tion is conducted using physiological processes that are, to a large 
extent, deterministic. However, sometimes this energy-expending 
phase evolves purely randomly, directed perhaps by a process akin 
to gradient descent.
The peaks in The H vs. t cUrve in fiGUre 4
Referring to Figure 3, it is seen that the peaks of the H vs. t curve in 
Figure 4 represent phase transitions, between an assertive and an 
interrogative phase. Such peaks can be regarded as critical points 
in the phase transition, and there has been a good deal of inter-
est in these points in recent years. Haldeman and Beggs (2005), 
for example, have shown in simulated neural networks that the 
number of metastable states in larger networks tended to peak at 
critical values, which can potentially store information. Perhaps 
even more relevant is the earlier paper, Beggs and Plenz (2003), 
which shows that branching parameters near a critical point opti-
mizes information transmission in feedforward networks. It is also 
significant (since psychophysical laws are often expressed as power 
laws) that propagation of activity in such networks are governed 
by a power law.www.frontiersin.org  June 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 17  |  7
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a principle borrowed from the physical sciences is seen to extend 
to the biological sciences. Conversely, the collapse of the wave-
function in quantum physics may be viewed as a special case of a 
principle of perception. Philosophically similar to fractal images, 
LCB functions are nested within other LCB functions. For example, 
reflex arcs operate locally as LCB functions, while the organism 
may carry out complex searching activity on LCB principles at 
the behavioral level.
The basic idea is that each stimulus will be met by an “anti-
stimulus”, or something that will try to “turn it off”. When we 
append to the Le Chatelier–Braun principle the conjecture that 
within the field of sensation, “success” in turning off the stimulus 
brings about a feeling of satisfaction or pleasure, while “failure” 
will bring dissatisfaction or pain, we can embrace an additional 
set of psychological phenomena, such as the delight in solving a 
puzzle, as well as medical symptomatology such as the discomfort 
of phantom limbs and of vertigo.
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for changes in uncertainty with the passage of time. However, an 
important distinction should be made. All stimuli discussed in 
this paper are constant stimuli, in that they do not autonomously 
change; all time-varying changes brought about in the system may 
be regarded as due to the restoring influence. For example we do not 
consider a stimulus in the form of a light of diminishing intensity; if 
the light does diminish in brightness, it is due to sensory adaptation 
or movement of the organism away from the source of light.
What is the psychophysical significance of the reduction of 
uncertainty that attends a process of perception? As discussed 
in various other sources (Norwich, 1993, 2001, 2005), when the 
stimulus is a simple, sensory, prothetic stimulus, the magnitude of 
uncertainty is reflected by the subjective magnitude of the stimu-
lus: a stimulus with greater uncertainty is attended by a greater 
subjective magnitude and vice versa. In this case, the restoring 
influence that reduces uncertainty is known as sensory adaptation. 
When these ideas applied to very simple stimuli are cast in math-
ematical form, one can derive using the uncertainty concept many 
psychophysical laws which had previously been largely empirical, 
such as Weber’s law, Fechner’s law, the power law of sensation, 
Piéron’s law for simple reaction times, the Blondel–Rey law, and 
many other familiar empirical equations (Norwich, 1993). When 
the stimuli are more complex, no simple mathematical structure 
will suffice, but the LCB principle still demonstrates the interre-
lationship between sensory and motor activity in the process of 
perception. One can perceive a degree of unity within the sciences: 